Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) 
Introduction
The traditional public key cryptosystem uses a certificate, which is a digitally signed statement issued by the CA (Certificate Authority). Such certificate can be verified by anyone and guarantees the authenticity of a user's public key. In implementation the management of public key certificates requires a large amount of computation, storage, and communication cost.
To handle this situation of public key certificate, Shamir [11] proposed another approach named "Identity Based Public Key Cryptography(ID-PKC)" in 1984. In this cryptosystem, the user's public key is some unique information about the identity of that user (e.g. an email address), which is assumed to be publicly known. Therefore, the need of certification can be eliminated. A trusted third party, called the Private Key Generator (PKG), generates private keys for all users in an ID-based system as in [11] . The PKG first publishes a master public key and retains the corresponding master secret key. To obtain a private key, one should contact PKG, which will use the master secret key to generate the corresponding private key. This approach however creates a new inherent problem namely the key escrow of a user's private key as PKG has the master secret key and thus has any user's private key in an IDbased system. The escrow problem could be partially solved by the introduction of multiple PKGs and the use of threshold technique which requires extra communication and infrastructure.
In 2003, AL-Riyami and Pateson [10] proposed a new paradigm called Certificateless public key cryptography. Like ID-PKC, certificateless cryptography does not use the public key certificate [10, 9, 13] . Although it also needs a third party called Trusted Authority (TA) to help a user to generate his private key but the TA do not require to access the user's full private key. It just generates a user's partial private key from the user's identity as the PKG in ID-PKC does. A user computes his full private key by combining his partial private key and a secret value chosen by himself. The public key of a user is computed from the TA's public parameters and the secret value of the user, and then it is published by the user himself.
In the original paper of Al-Riyami and Paterson presented [10] a certificateless signature scheme. Huang et. al., [6] pointed out a security drawback in it [10] and proposed a secure one. They defined the security model of certificateless signature scheme in the same paper. Further improvement in this direction are due to Zhang et. al., [14] , Yum [13] , Hu et. al., [7] , Gorantla et. al., [5] and Yap et. al., [12] . Although, last two constructions [5, 12] are the efficient certificateless signature scheme but they suffer from universal forgery and involve large amount of pairing computation during verification. In our opinion, said two short comings could be substantially reduced if we construct a certificateless signature based on bilinear pairing using the chameleon hash function.
The concept of chameleon hashing was first introduced by Krawczyk and Rabin [8] . It was based on well established hash-and-sign paradigm, where a chameleon hash function is used to compute the cryptographic message digest. A chameleon hash function is a trapdoor oneway hash function which prevents everyone except the holder of the trapdoor information from computing the collisions for a randomly given input. Chameleon signatures simultaneously provide the properties of non-repudiation and non-transferability for the signed message.
In this paper, we propose a first certificateless signature scheme based on bilinear pairings using chameleon hash function. The proposed scheme is more efficient then other CLS and it is unforgeable under the hardness assumption of the q-strong Diffie-Hellman problem and computational Diffie-Hellman Problem.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe background concepts of bilinear pairing and related mathematical problems. In Section 3, we propose our scheme. The security analysis of our propose scheme is given in Section 4. Efficiency of our scheme in section 5. Finally, conclusion is made in Section 6.
Background Concepts
In this section, we briefly review the basic concepts on bilinear pairings and some related mathematical problems. :
with the following properties:
• Bilinear:
e(R + S, T) = e(R, T)e(S, T) and e(R, S + T) = e(R, S)e(R, T).
• Non-degenerate: There exists
IG denotes the identity element of the group 2 G .
• Computable: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute
In general implementation 1 G will be a group of points on an elliptic curve and 1 G will denote a multiplicative subgroup of a finite field. Typically, the mapping e will be derived from either the Weil or the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. We refer [2] for more comprehensive description on how these groups, pairings and other parameters are defined.
Definition 2.0.2 ( Mathematical Problems[4]).
Here we discuss some mathematical problems, which form the basis of security for our scheme.
• Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP): Given two elements P and Q, to find an integer q Z n  such that Q = nP whenever such an integer exists.
• • Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem(GDHP): A class of problems where CDHP is hard while DDHP is easy.
• The q-Strong Diffie-Hellman problem(q-SDHP): Given a (q + 2)-tuple
Proposed Scheme
Now we propose a certificate less signature scheme based on bilinear pairing using chameleon hash function. It consists of five algorithms namely Setup, Extract, Sign, Verify and Dispute.
Setup:
The TA performs the following step.
Let k be a security parameter and let 1 G is a cyclic additive group generated by P with prime order q,
2
G is a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q, and 
Dispute:
In case of a dispute on the validity of a signature, signer can turn to an authorized judge J is trusted party. J gets from signer a signature tuple SIG(m) = (m, r, sig).
 J applies the above verification Algorithm. If this verification fails then the alleged signature is rejected by J. Otherwise,  J summons the signer to deny/accept the claim. J sends the tuple (m, r, sig) to recipient.  If the recipient wants to claim that signature is invalid he will need to provide a collision in the chameleon hash function. Otherwise, recipient simply confirms to the judge this fact. The following is the process that generates collision in the chameleon hash function. 7, No.3 (2014) Recipient shows the collision pair (m',R'). recipient can convince the judge to reject the forgery chameleon signature tuple (m', r', sig).
Security Analysis
4.1. Correctness. The correctness of the signature is given by the equation given below:-The equation for forgery is: 
The proposed scheme is unforgeable under the hardness assumption of the q-strong DiffieHellman problem and Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
On the one hand, even the PKG who knows the master key s, the partial private key of Alice, and the public key , then he can forge BLS signatures [3] which are proven to be unforgeable based on the CDH assumption.
On the other hand, any third party may try to find compute a valid signature via two ways. holds. However, due to the hardness of the q-strong Diffie-Hellman problem, computational Diffie-Hellman problem and the one-way property of cryptographic hash function and chameleon hashing, the adversary can not forge a valid signature by this two ways.
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The formal security analysis is the same as Barreto et al., provably-secure identity based signatures and signcryption from bilinear maps identity-based signatures [ 
Efficiency
We can conclude that our scheme is a little more efficient than Al-Riyami and Paterson's certificateless signature scheme [10] is given below: 
Conclusion
In the above paras, we have proposed a certificateless chameleon signature scheme based on bilinear pairings by eliminating the key escrow problem, which is an inherent drawback of ID-based cryptosystems, by using the user's chosen secret value. The scheme is proved to be secure under under the hardness assumption of the bilinear pairing inversion problem and Computational Diffie-Hellman problem.
